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BRIEF OF LAW AND RELIGION
PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
With the joint written consent of the parties filed
with the Clerk of the Court, Law and Religion Professors respectfully submit this brief as arnici curiae.1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Law and Religion Professors include men and
women who teach constitutional law, religious studies, and employment discrimination law, who are
concerned that the ministerial exception denies equal
opportunity and civil rights to thousands of men and
women who work for religious employers. They wish
to ensure that the range of scholarly views on the
ministerial exception - including those that understand the widespread problem of discrimination and
the need for legal protection from discrimination are before the Court. They do not believe that the
Religion Clauses require the ministerial exception,
and think it ought to be eliminated. A complete list of
amici is provided in the Appendix.

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.3(a) of the Rules of this Court, amici
file this brief with the consent of all parties, as they have filed
consent letters with the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to Rule
37.6, amici affirm that no counsel for a party authored this brief
in whole or in part, and that no person, other than amici and
their counsel, made a monetary contribution to its preparation
or submission.

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The ministerial exception deprives religious employees of basic employment protections and is not
required by the Religion Clauses.
The ministerial exception has breathtaking consequences for the civil rights of thousands of men and
women who work for religious organizations. Any
employee (including elementary and secondary school
teachers, school principals, university professors,
music teachers, choir directors, organists, administrators, secretaries, communications managers and
nurses) at any religious employer (mosque, synagogue, church, school, hospital, nursing home, faithbased social service organization, or other non-profit
religious organization) is at risk of losing the protection of the employment laws (including the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Family & Medical Leave Act, Workers’ Compensation laws and state tort and contract law) as
long as the employer decides that the employee performs important functions in the religion.
The ministerial exception creates a lawless
zone in defiance of Employment Division v. Smith’s
requirement that the courts not create exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability. As Smith
warned, such exemptions "make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect [] permit every citizen to become

a law unto himself." 494 U.S. at 879. Smith would be
meaningless unless it applied to religious institutions
as well as individuals. Thus the Americans with
Disabilities Act, a neutral law of general applicability,
can and should be applied to religious organizations.
This Court’s church property cases do not require
a different result. Any deference to church hierarchy
shown in those cases was motivated by a concern that
the state would entangle itself in theological or doctrinal disputes. Reliance on that line of cases is also
misplaced because it ignores Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595 (1979), the last church property dispute decided
by this Court. Jones explicitly rejects blanket deference to religious institutions in matters of internal
governance. Jones further recognized that a deference
approach might cause more establishment problems
than a neutral principles of law approach.
Hosanna-Tabor illustrates this last point: trying to discern whether Perich is a minister will entangle courts in religious doctrine more than simply
adjudicating her retaliation claim. Deciding whether
Perich’s termination was caused by protected activity,
when the school wrote her a letter stating that it
intended to fire her because she threatened legal
action, does not involve any doctrinal issues.
In contrast, deciding whether Perich’s service as
a Christian role model for her students is important
to the religious mission of the school requires the
court to delve into the religious beliefs of the HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church. Resolving a

4
theological dispute about the religious role of schoolteachers is precisely the kind of doctrinal issue the
courts are incompetent to make, yet the ministerial
exception requires such theological analysis in this
case.
These consequences can be readily avoided because the Religion Clauses do not require the ministerial exception. The argument that they do ignores
Employment Division v. Smith’s Free Exercise standard, misinterprets the Establishment Clause, and
misunderstands the nature of Perich’s retaliation
claim.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION HAS
BREATHTAKING IMPLICATIONS FOR
DENYING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND
INSTITUTIONS.

Petitioner’s standard, which removes teachers
and scores of other employees of religious organizations from the protection of the antidiscrimination, antiretaliation and other employment laws,
would be devastating for those employees. A victory
for Hosanna-Tabor in these circumstances wo~d be
far-reaching in its negative consequences.

5
A. In defiance of Employment Division v.
Smith, the lower courts have exempted
religious institutions from employment
laws and made those institutions a law
unto themselves.
In Smith this Court warned of the negative
consequences if the courts continued to grant constitutional exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability. There would be exemptions "of almost
every conceivable kind - ranging from compulsory
military service, to health and safety regulation such
as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory
vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws, to social
welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child
labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races." Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89
[internal citations omitted]. "The First Amendment’s
protection of religious liberty," this Court concluded,
"does not require this." Id.
Smith’s prediction about exemptions has come
true: a broad array of employment laws is not being
applied to thousands of religious organizations and
their hundreds of thousands of employees - all because of the ministerial exception.
In the name of the ministerial exception, state
and federal courts have exempted religious institutions from the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act, the
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Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family & Medical
Leave Act, Workers’ Compensation laws and state
tort and contract law.2 Thus, despite Congress’ clear
intent to apply the employment discrimination statutes to religious organizations, the courts have applied the ministerial exception to most of the civil
2 See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999)
(choir director’s ADA claim dismissed); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese
of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (music director could not
bring ADEA claim); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir.
2008) (priest could not bring Title VII racial discrimination
claim); Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir.
2006) (college chaplain could not bring Title VII sex discrimination claim); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320
F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (Hispanic Communications Manager
could not bring Title VII national origin claim); Combs v. Central
Texas Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343 (5th Cir. 1999) (former clergy member could not bring
pregnancy discrimination claim); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010) (director of the
Department of Religious Formation could not bring an Equal
Pay Act claim); Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help Roman
Catholic Church, No. 05-CV-0404, 2005 WL 2455253 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 5, 2005) (Director of Music precluded from bringing FMLA
suit); McCants v. Alabama-West Florida Conference of United
Methodist Church, Inc., 372 F. App’x 39 (llth Cir. 2010) (African
American pastor could not bring section 1981 race and retaliation claim); Ross v. Metropolitan Church of God, 471 F.Supp. 2d
1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (Director of Worship Arts (music director)
barred from bringing section 1981 claim); Malichi v. Archdiocese
of Miami, 945 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (priest could
not bring state workers’ compensation claim); Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th
Cir. 2010) (seminarian could not bring state minimum wage
claim); Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654 (2d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (U.S. 2010) (rabbi’s breach of
contract claim dismissed).
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rights protection that this country affords to American employees.
Thousands of religious organizations may enjoy
exemption from these laws. The United States is the
most religiously diverse nation in the world’s history,
with at least 80 percent of the population selfidentifying as religious.3 The Hartford Institute concludes that there are "roughly 335,000" religious
congregations in the United States; about 300,000 of
those are Protestant, 22,000 are Catholic and Orthodox, and 12,000 are non-Christian.4 According to
Bureau of the Census estimates, in 2008 government
agencies reported that 179,682 religious organizations
of all sorts had about 1.7 million paid employees.~
In the area of education alone, the United States
is home to 22,731 religious elementary and secondary
schools employing 314,489 full-time equivalent (FTE)
teachers.6 There are 18,000 teachers in Lutheran

~ Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, American Religious
Identification Survey 2008, http://www.americanreligionsurveyaris.org/reports/highlights.html.
4 Hartford Institute for Religion Research, Fast Facts,
http://hirr.hartsem, edu/research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html.
5 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Businesses: 2008,
http://www.census.gov/epccYsusb/2008/us/US81.HTM.
~ U.S. Dep’t of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics, Characteristics of Private Schools in the United
States: Results from the 2009-2010 Private School Universe Survey, at 7, Table 2, May 26, 2011, http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/
pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2011339.

8
Schools across the United States. Brief for PlaintiffAppellant EEOC at 44, EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Nos.
09-1134 & 09-1135. Roman Catholic elementary and
secondary schools employ 151,473 full-time equivalent professional staff, of whom 73.9% are lay women,
22.4% lay men and only 3.7% religious.~ There are
at least 820 Jewish and 203 Islamic K-12 schools,s
Under Petitioner’s standard all those teachers, including, ironically, the lay personnel, could become
ministers overnight at the discretion of their employers. The threat extends to universities; there are
about 900 religiously-affiliated colleges and universities with 1.7 million students in the United
States, including 200 Bible colleges, 111 intentionallyChrist-centered colleges, 38 Lutheran colleges, and
235 Catholic colleges and universities.9 Several courts
have already relied upon the ministerial exception to
dismiss lawsuits of university professors without
~ National Catholic Education Association, Catholic School
Data: United States Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools
2010-2011, http://www.ncea.org/news/AnnualDataReport.asp.
8 U.S. Dep’t of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics, Private School Universe Survey, http://nces.ed.gov/
surveys/pss/privateschoolsearcl~.
9 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Catholic Church in the United States at a Glance, (figures through
2009) http://www.usccb.org/comm/catholic-church-statistics.shtml;
Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, About CCCU,
http’]/www.cccu.org/about; Our Colleges, Lutheran Colleges http://
www.lutherancolleges.org/.
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review of their academic qualifications or employment
records.1°
The number of individuals affected is not limited to
ordained clergy. Already the rule has been applied to
teachers, principals, communications managers, administrative personnel, music directors, and musicians.11
Those denied a day in court include whistleblower

lo See, e.g, EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (canon law professor’s Title VII sex discrimination
case dismissed); Klouda v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 543 F.Supp. 2d 594 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (seminary
professor’s breach of contract case dismissed); Hope Int’l Univ. v.
Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 719 (2004) (psychologists who
were Marriage and Family Therapy professors had marital
discrimination case dismissed); McEnroy v. St. Meinrad School
of Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (seminary
professor’s breach of contract and tortious interference case
dismissed); Alicea v. New Brunswick Seminary, 608 A.2d 218
(N.J. 1992) (theology professor’s breach of contract claim dismissed); Jocz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 538 N.W.2d 588
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (seminary director of field education’s sex
discrimination lawsuit dismissed).
11 See, e.g., Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of SeventhDay Adventists, 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1998) (elementary school
teacher’s ADEA claim dismissed); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d
173 (5th Cir. 1999) (choirmaster’s ADA claim dismissed); Tomic
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006)
(music director could not bring ADEA claim); Alicea-Hernandez
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Hispanic Communications Manager could not bring Title VII
national origin claim); Pardue v. Center City of Consortium
Schools, 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (school principal’s race and
retaliation claim dismissed).
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teachers seeking to protect their students12 and a
United Methodist minister who helped his female
colleague to draft a sexual harassment complaint.1~
The effect has been especially strong on teachers elementary and high school teachers, school principals, college and university instructors and professors
- whom the courts have turned into ministers, denying them the protection of the disability, age, gender,
pregnancy, race, sexual harassment, and breach
of contract laws.14 Petitioner’s rule, which would
12 See, e.g., Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756
N.W.2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (elementary school teacher
reporting possible sexual abuse).
i~ See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
203 F.3d 1299 (llth Cir. 2000).
1, See, e.g., Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of SeventhDay Adventists, 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1998) (elementary school
teacher’s ADEA claim dismissed); Redhead v. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 566 F.Supp. 2d 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(elementary school teacher’s pregnancy discrimination lawsuit
dismissed); Stately v. Indian Cmty. Sch. of Milwaukee, Inc., 351
F.Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (elementary and middle school
teacher’s race and religion discrimination claim dismissed);
Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, No. 18468, 2011 WL 3200322
(Conn. Aug. 2, 2011) (school principal’s claims dismissed under
ministerial exception); Pardue v. the Center City of Consortium
Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669
(D.C. 2005) (school principal’s race and retaliation claim dismissed); Temple Emanuel of Newton v: Massachusetts Comm’n
Against Discrimination, CIV.A. 09-1950, 2009 WL 1668550
(Mass. Super. June 2, 2009) (Hebrew Day School teacher’s age
discrimination suit dismissed); Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius
Parish, 672 A.2d 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (high
school principal’s breach of contract claim dismissed); Coulee
Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d
(Continued on following page)
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essentially allow the religious employer to immunize
itself from antidiscrimination laws by designating
just about any employee a minister, would further
expand this denial of protection.
One irony and injustice in the ministerial rule is
that women employees of denominations that do not
ordain women suddenly become ministers at the
moment they file a lawsuit. Although some Roman
Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox Jewish women may
not become priests, imams, or rabbis and perform
their jobs with full understanding that they cannot be
ministers, the courts and churches confer ministerial
status upon them just long enough to keep their
lawsuits out of court.15

868 (Wis. 2009) (first grade teacher’s age discrimination case
dismissed).
1~ Cases involving Catholic women deemed ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception include: Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (non-ordained chaplain
assured women were eligible for her position); Alicea-Hernandez
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Catholic communications director); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010) (Catholic Director of Religious Formation); Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton
Church, CIV.A. 301CV2352MRK, 2004 WL 721774 (D. Conn.
Mar. 30, 2004) (Director of Religious Education); Pardue v. the
Center City of Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (school principal); Archdiocese
of Miami, Inc. v. Minagorri, 954 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (school principal); Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend
Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003) (Director of Religious
Education); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756
N.W.2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (elementary school teacher);
(Continued on following page)
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Individual American clergy also deserve the
protection of the laws that shield their fellow citizens.
Petitioner argues that church control over its ministers is absolute while ignoring the troubling consequences of church autonomy for individual members
of the clergy. Petitioner’s rule automatically removes
clergy from legal protection, leaving them subject to
sexual harassment, discrimination, and wage and
hour violations. Reverend Pamela Combs’ pregnancy
discrimination case was dismissed under the ministerial exception, for example, even though the United
Methodist Church had returned her to lay status in
order to end her insurance coverage. Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999). Rabbi Leavy
and Sister Rosati were terminated for foot surgery
and breast cancer, respectively, but could not litigate
their disabilities claims. Leavy v. Congregation Beth
Shalom, 490 F.Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2007);
Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese, 233 F.Supp.
2d 917 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see also Starkman v. Evans,
198 F.3d 173 ~5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007); Werft v.
Desert Sw. Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Cronin v. S.
Indiana Annual Conference, 1:05 CV 1804 LJM WTL,

Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish, 672 A.2d 217 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996) (high school principal); Coulee Catholic Sch. v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, Dept. of Workforce Dev., 768
N.W.2d 868 (Wis. 2009) (first grade teacher).
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2007 WL 2258762 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2007) (all dismissing disabilities cases because of the ministerial
exception).
The sexual harassment, antiretaliation and minimum wage cases demonstrate that male and female
seminarians and clergy may require legal protection
from their church supervisors and colleagues. The
courts are currently divided on applying the ministerial exception in the sexual harassment context.
Compare Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375
F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing sexual harassment
claim) with Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
Elvig). A Mexican seminarian who moved to Washington State and performed maintenance work as part
of his duties was denied the protection of sexual harassment, antiretaliation and state minimum
wage laws simply because he was a seminarian. See
Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of
Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 2010). A
ruling for Petitioner by this Court would imply that
seminarians, clergy and rabbis may be harassed and
exploited at work without legal remedy as the courts
protect the churches’ autonomy from the law rather
than the rights of individual employees.
In none of the cited cases did the religious defendants argue that their religious tenets required
discrimination, sexual harassment, or other illegal
conduct. Some courts have understood this point and
demonstrated that the employment laws can be
applied to religious employees, including teachers,
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without adverse effect on religious freedom.TM The
courts are capable of adjudicating employment cases
against religious organizations without need of the
ministerial exception.
B.

The ministerial exception undermines
our country’s strong commitment to
civil rights for all.

Petitioner emphasizes the need for members of
religious organizations to resolve their conflicts internally, without court review, and without regard to
neutral laws of general applicability. However
"[e]mployment discrimination cases are simply not
’internal’ matters." Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.L. Rev. 391, 408-409
(1987). As Professor Lupu observed in criticizing the
ministerial exception three years before Smith was
decided, the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws
not only protects plaintiffs but also serves public and
third party interests: "Religious institutions ... are
influential in shaping behavior and moral convictions. The way in which such institutions treat

16 See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d
Cir. 1993) (high school teacher allowed to sue for age discrimination); Longo v. Regis Jesuit High Sch., 02-CV-001957-PSF-OES,
2006 WL 197336 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2006) (ADA claim allowed for
high school teacher); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206
(1992) (computer professors allowed to sue a Catholic university
for breach of contract).
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women or racial minorities is likely to have significant consequences in other spheres of life. Those who
may suffer these consequences thus have a vital
interest in the behavior of religious institutions." Id.
Given these important public interests, "these~ disputes cannot reasonably be perceived as ’internal.’"
Id.
The antidiscrimination laws reflect these public
interests. Congress has chosen to apply civil rights
laws to religious organizations. In passing the landmark Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for
example, Congress exempted religious organizations
from lawsuits for religious discrimination but allowed
them to be sued for race, color, sex and national origin
discrimination. Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F.Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-l(a), 2000e-2(e). Congress made a similar
choice in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12113(d)(1)-(d)(2), 12203, choosing not to
exempt religious organizations from the statute’s
retaliation provision, and ensuring protection for all
the estimated 5,903,000 persons with disabilities in
the labor force.17 Finally, both Congress and this
Court have recognized the particular importance of
enforcing the antiretaliation provisions of all the civil
rights laws. See, e.g., Thompson v. North American
~r Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics, Table
A-6: Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex, Age
and Disability Status, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Feb. 5, 2010,
http://www.bls.gov/webappsflegacy/cpsatab6.htm.
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Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011) ("Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a
broad range of employer conduct."); Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
67 (2006) ("Interpreting the antiretaliation provision
to provide broad protection from retaliation helps
ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment
of the Act’s primary objective depends.").
The courts have held that these laws may be
applied to religious schools without violating free
exercise or establishment principles. For example,
religious schools have been ordered to comply with
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act even though their
religious tenets regard married men as heads of
households and require providing them with better
health insurance or salaries than married women.
EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th
Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751
F.Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990). Religious employers
have been required to obey the child labor laws, see
Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196 (4th
Cir. 1989), and the minimum wage laws, see Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290 (1985).
Thus the consequences of upholding the ministerial exception are not only devastating to the thousands of men and women who work for religious
organizations, but also detrimental to the broad and
fair enforcement of the civil rights statutes. The rule
is also unnecessary; neither the Free Exercise Clause
nor the Establishment Clause requires it.
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II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE DOES NOT
REQUIRE THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION.
A. Employment Division v. Smith held that
neutral laws of general applicability
like the Americans with Disabilities Act
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), this Court held that so long as a law is neutral
and generally applicable, it does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause even if it imposes a substantial
burden on religion. Id. at 879. Smith itself upheld a
law that prohibited a religious sacrament. Id. at 874,
890. Because the Americans with Disabilities Act is
unquestionably both neutral and generally applicable, Smith should defeat any free exercise justification.
Hosanna-Tabor asserts that Smith applies only
to individual free exercise claims and not to institutional ones, relying on a single line from Smith stating that "the government may not.., lend its power
to one or the other side in controversies over religious
authority and dogma." Id. at 877. Hosanna-Tabor
reads the phrase "religious authority" as a reference
to church hierarchy and those who lead the church
and then concludes that Smith does not apply to
cases involving ministers. Thus, Petitioner argues,
while a religious individual may not violate a neutral
law of general applicability, a religious organization
may.
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The quoted phrase cannot possibly bear this
weight. The Court’s language about "lend[ing] its
power to one or the other side in controversies over
religious authority and dogma" refers to the Establishment Clause constraint against the courts’ selecting one side over another when dealing with a
theological or doctrinal conflict between religious
factions. As discussed below, the sentence alludes to a
line of cases dealing with the disposition of church
property, where, unlike here, the Court was faced
with the actual prospect of resolving doctrinal disputes. Those cases say nothing about how to resolve a
conflict between a religious entity and a neutral law
of general applicability. Smith addresses that question simply and directly: The religious entity must
bend to the law.
B.

The history and text of the Free Exercise Clause do not support the ministerial exception.

Petitioner and their amici conclude that religious
employers must be exempted from neutral laws of
general applicability because of a historical tradition
of church autonomy from government interference
that is protected by the First Amendment. Yet history
does not support this claim.
First, "nothing in the debates or early drafts of
the religion clauses gives the slightest support to the
concept of corporate free exercise exemptions." Lupu,
67 B.U.L. Rev., at 419; see also Marci A. Hamilton,
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Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the
Public Good, 2004 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1099, 1133-34 (2004)
(the Constitution requires churches to obey the rule
of law). Instead, James Madison feared the power of
both state and church; late in life he warned against
"the potential abuse of ecclesiastical corporate power."
Forrest Church, So Help Me God: The Founding Fathers and the First Great Battle Over Church
and State 355 (2007). Even Protestant clergy of the
revolutionary era supported the First Amendment
because they understood that "[p]ower, civil and ecclesiastical, has to be deflated, diffused, and properly
related in order to keep it from becoming absolute,
arbitrary and abused." James H. Smylie, Protestant
Clergy, the First Amendment and the Beginnings of a
Constitutional Debate, 1781-91, in The Religion of the
Republic 153 (Elwyn A. Smith, ed., 1971) (emphasis
added).
Second, the idea that the Free Exercise Clause
offers greater protection to religious institutions than
to religious individuals contradicts the commonly recognized idea that liberty of conscience is the fundamental principle underlying the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 346 (2002). As the late constitutional
scholar Philip Kurland concluded, "[1limited powers of
government were not instituted to expand the realm
of power of religious organizations, but rather in
favor of freedom of action and thought by the people."
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Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1961).
Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to protect
religious institutions’ rights against their members
ignores the experience of the earliest Americans. "The
American Revolution broke many of the intimate ties
that had traditionally linked religion and government,..., and turned religion into a voluntary affair,
a matter of individual free choice." Gordon S. Wood,
Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic,
1789-1815 576 (2009). Americans of that era broke
away from traditional religious organizations and
pursued individual liberty. Id. at 609-13. They "believed that the individual, not the state or the church,
should decide matters of faith." Frank Lambert, The
Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America 180 (2003) (emphasis added). Allowing the courts
to enforce a rule that automatically favors religious
institutions over their members is at odds with this
history of liberty of conscience.
In short, it would contradict history to conclude
that the Free Exercise Clause requires protecting
religious institutions absolutely from neutral laws of
general applicability while not protecting religious
individuals at all.
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C.

The church property cases do not establish a broad rule of deference to church
hierarchy in matters of internal governance.

Hosanna-Tabor also argues that this Court’s decisions in the church property cases support its view
that the Free Exercise Clause mandates the ministerial exception. They do not. The church property
cases, including those mentioned in Smith, do not
hold that courts must absolutely defer to the church
in matters of internal church governance. Instead,
the decisions focus on avoiding entanglement in
church doctrine. In addition, the most recent church
property case, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979),
explicitly rejects mandatory deference even in cases
involving internal church affairs.
1. The main concern of the church
property cases was the fear that
courts would decide doctrinal and
theological issues.
On the rare occasions when the Court has deferred to church hierarchy, it did so to avoid entangling itself in theological or doctrinal disputes,is As
18 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) ("The
First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil
courts may play in resolving church property disputes. Most
importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from
resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious
doctrine and practice.") (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Frederick
(Continued on following page)
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the Court noted in Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1968): "not every civil court decision as
to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment ....
But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized
when church property litigation is made to turn on
the resolution by civil courts of controversies over
religious doctrine and practice." Id. at 449.
In fact, in Presbyterian Church, the first church
property case cited in Smith, the Supreme Court did
not actually defer to church hierarchy. Instead, the
Court invalidated a Georgia law that required ~he
courts to resolve a property dispute between a general church and breakaway local churches by deciding
whether the general church had departed from the
religious tenets it held at the time the local churches
first affiliated with it. 393 U.S. at 440, 441, 449-50.
Similar entanglement concerns explain the holdings of the two other property cases cited by Smith.
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94
(1952), the Court opted for deference to the highest
church body after rejecting the New York legislature’s
finding that one faction would better carry out the
Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal
State, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 47, 57; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tt~ttle,
Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious
Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 Geo. J. Law & Pub. Pol’y 119,
132 (2009).
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church’s mission. Id. at 106 n.10, 107-09, 117-18.
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Court declined to rule on
whether the church properly applied its own policies.
Notably, the cases do not address whether a court
has the competence to rule on whether the church
failed to abide by the state’s laws.
2.

Jones v. Wolf, the most recent church
property case, rejects mandatory
deference in cases involving internal
church governance.

Petitioner’s reliance on the church property cases
is further misplaced because it ignores Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595 (1979), the last church property dispute
decided by this Court. As the most recent case involving churches rather than individuals, Jones’s precedential value cannot be ignored. Jones explicitly
rejects blanket deference to religious institutions.
Like previous church property disputes, Jones
involved a schism within a church. A majority of the
Vineville church in Macon, Georgia, voted to separate
from the Presbyterian Church in the United States.
443 U.S. at 598. Both the majority congregation and
the minority that wished to remain affiliated with the
Presbyterian Church in the United States claimed
the church property as their own. Id.
This Court rejected a rule requiring it to defer to
the church hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States: "We cannot agree, however, that
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the First Amendment requires ... a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving
church property disputes, even when no issue of
doctrinal controversy is involved." 443 U.S. at 605.
Instead, the Supreme Court endorsed as one
option a neutral principles of law approach. Id. at 604
("We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally
entitled to adopt a neutral principles of law approach
as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.").19 In other words, the Court endorsed resolving
the church property dispute in the same manner that
it would deal with a secular organization. Thus, the
Court approved "examin[ing] the deeds to the properties, the state statutes dealing with implied trust,
and the Book of Church Order to determine whether
there was any basis for a trust in favor of the general
church." Id. at 600.
The Jones Court did recognize that Establishment Clause issues may arise when applying a neutral principles of law approach. Id. at 604 ("This is
not to say that the application of the neutralprinciples approach is wholly free of difficulty.").
Nevertheless, the neutral principles of law approach
19 This neutral principles of law approach was also approved in the first "church autonomy" case cited in Smith: "And
there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all
property disputes, which can be applied without ’establishing’
churches to which property is awarded." Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 449 (1969).
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is constitutional "so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and
liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." Id. at 602.
Thus, simply because an Establishment Clause issue
may arise in adjudicating a particular type of claim
does not mean the court must forever abandon trying
to resolve such a claim using neutral principles of law.
Furthermore, the Jones Court recognized that a
deference approach does not eliminate all Establishment Clause problems. When church structure is
ambiguous, determining which unit of church governance has ultimate control might well result in
entanglement with church doctrine. 443 U.S. at 605.
In that case, it is actually the neutral principles of
law approach that can best avoid entanglement
because it "obviates the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling
church property disputes." Id. at 605.
In sum, neither Smith nor the church property
cases that preceded it require deference to HosannaTabor in its dealings with Cheryl Perich. Instead, a
court may resolve Perich’s retaliation claim in the
same way it resolves any other retaliation claim.
Only if adjudication of this claim entangles the court
in theological or doctrinal questions should the courts
opt for deference to church authorities. This is especially true where, as Jones v. Wolf acknowledges, a
deference approach might actually cause more Establishment Clause ills than a neutral principles of law
approach.
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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOES
NOT REQUIRE THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION.
Hosanna-Tabor asserts that resolving discrimination claims would violate the Establishment Clause
because adjudicating them would entangle the courts
with religion by requiring courts to evaluate a minister’s spiritual qualifications or determine whether a
minister sufficiently embodies the church and its
teachings. Yet, even assuming that some employment
discrimination cases could present such issues, not all
do and this one certainly does not. On the contrary,
applying the ministerial exception to Perich’s claim
requires the Court to resolve theological disputes.
Consequently, the Establishment Clause cannot justify the blanket immunity of the ministerial exception.
A.

Resolving Perich’s retaliation claim
does not require the Court to decide
any doctrinal or theological questions.

Hosanna-Tabor incorrectly assumes that adjudicating ministers’ antidiscrimination claims will require
courts to decide questions beyond their institutional
competence. A court may decide Perich’s retaliation
claim without ever becoming entangled in doctrinal
or theological questions. In order to prevail, Perich
must prove: (1) she engaged in activity protected by
the ADA; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action;
and (3) there was a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action. See, e.g., Barrett v.
Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 516 (6th Cir. 2009);
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Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir.
2007). These elements are easily met and do not
implicate any religious doctrine.
Perich’s protected activity was asserting her legal
rights under the ADA, and the adverse action was her
termination. As in most retaliation cases, the pivotal
question is whether the assertion of her legal rights
caused her termination. It is undisputed that HosannaTabor sent Perich a letter stating it was terminating
her because she had acted disruptively and threatened to sue. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774. Thus,
Perich has direct evidence of retaliation.
Hosanna-Tabor nevertheless argues that there is
a religious question because Perich was fired for
being insubordinate and spiritually unfit. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari of Defendant-Petitioner at 6,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011) (arguing
Perich was fired "because her insubordination and
threats of litigation violated Church teaching"). First,
the school argues, Perich had been unruly and disruptive when asserting her legal rights, thereby
ruining her relationship with the school. HosannaTabor, 597 F.3d at 774. Second, instead of trusting
the church’s mandatory internal dispute resolution
process, Perich sued in court.
These arguments lack merit. Terminating an
employee for asserting her legal rights is the very
definition of retaliation, and is illegal no matter how
disruptive, insubordinate, or infuriating the employer
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may find it. Next, any contract that purports to waive
an employee’s right to sue for an ADA violation is void
as against public policy. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1974) (employees may not by
contract prospectively waive their civil rights). That
is, a contractual provision stipulating that all discrimination claims will be resolved internally rather
than before a neutral third party is unenforceable.
Moreover, Petitioner’s argument boils down to
this assertion: A religious organization should be able
to proclaim ministers spiritually unfit any time that
they assert their legal rights or insist that the church
follow the law, and for the secular courts to disagree
with this assessment violates the Establishment Clause.
Petitioner’s argument is incorrect. A court could
resolve this retaliation claim without entangling itself in theology or doctrine. A court could analyze
whether Hosanna-Tabor’s alleged religious motivation was merely a pretext for discrimination. Indeed,
in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton, 477 U.S.
619 (1986), a case that parallels this one, this Court
gave its blessing to a pretext analysis. In that case, a
Christian school told a pregnant teacher she could
not return to school the following year because of its
belief that mothers should stay home with their
preschool children. Id. at 623. When she threatened
litigation, the school fired her for violating the mandatory internal dispute resolution provision in her
contract, arguing that Christians should not sue
other Christians. Id. at 622-23. Although the ultimate
holding focused on abstention issues, the Court noted
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that "[t]he Commission violates no constitutional
rights by merely investigating the circumstances of
[the schoolteacher’s] discharge in this case, if only to
ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason
was in fact the reason for the discharge." Id. at 628.5°
Alternatively, a court could accept HosannaTabor’s argument that it was religious considerations
and not pique or financial considerations~1 that motivated Perich’s dismissal in this case, and still hold
that the church violated the law. This is because
Hosanna-Tabor’s claim that Perich was spiritually
unfit because she threatened legal action does not in
fact deny that the termination was retaliatory. Instead, the argument is that the retaliation is religiously required. Nonetheless, it is still an admission
of retaliation.
In this scenario, to the extent there is a religious
question, it is a free exercise question. The question
for a court is not interpreting religious doctrine or
tenets, or even ascertaining the school’s real motives,
but deciding whether a neutral law of general applicability (retaliation is illegal) supersedes a religious obligation (retaliation is religiously required).
2o See also Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exception, 75 Fordham L. Rev.
1965, 2016-22 (2005) (explaining in detail why pretext analysis
does not require courts to become entangled in theological or
doctrinal issues).
21 During Perich’s leave, the school hired a replacement for
the rest of the year instead of a more limited time frame.
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Under Smith, as long as the law is neutral and generally applicable, it may substantially burden a
religious practice. That Hosanna-Tabor may not be
able to follow the dictates of its religion in terminating an employee is no different from a Free Exercise
standpoint than the individuals in Smith not being
able to perform the sacrament their religion requires.
This is not to say that the First Amendment
provides no protection for the church-minister relationship. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000), this Court held that the Boy Scouts’ freedom of association right to exclude gays as scoutmasters in order to convey an anti-homosexual
message trumped state antidiscrimination law. Id. at
653-56. Depending on how the Court weighs the
state’s antidiscrimination goals against the religious
institution’s free speech rights, the same principle
could apply to religious organizations who, for example, limit their clergy positions to men on the grounds
that admitting women would undermine their religious messages about the nature of ministry. Thus,
if the ministerial exception were eliminated, some
protection for clergy hiring decisions remains under
freedom of association.22

2~ Any protection provided by the freedom of association
would be much narrower than the current ministerial exception.
Dale protects expressive association, allowing the organization to
convey its viewpoint. Therefore, if a minister was fired because
of her disability (or age or race or sex), and the church employer
has no religious tenets requiring dismissal of people due to
(Continued on following page)
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Of course, even before Smith (and even after
Dale) the fact that a law burdened a religious tenet
did not guarantee an exemption from that law. Courts
have rejected arguments that religious organizations
should be exempt from retaliation claims because of
their religious beliefs about litigation. See, e.g., EEOC
v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272,
1280 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Seventh Day Adventists’ free exercise claim for religiously required retaliation on the grounds "the government’s compelling
interest in assuring equal employment opportunities
justifies this burden"). To allow religious institutions
to retaliate and to accept the school’s all-litigiousministers-are-spiritually-deficient argument means
that a church would be able to dismiss as insubordinate and spiritually unfit a minister who was raped
by a coworker and brings a sexual assault charge. A
church would be able to terminate without interference a minister who threatens to sue after the church
breaches its contract and fails to pay the agreed-upon
salary. Likewise, a church or religious school or
religious hospital would be able to fire as insubordinate and spiritually unfit a minister who reports to
civil authorities any wrongdoing, whether it be embezzlement or negligence or the sexual abuse of
children. In short, letting a religious organization
claim that a minister who insists on compliance with
the law is spiritually unfit creates a potentially
disability (or age or race or sex), then there should be no First
Amendment problem letting her resume her post.
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limitless loophole that makes each church a "law unto
itself." Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
B.

Deciding whether Perich is a minister
does entangle the Court in doctrinal
and theological disputes and violates
the Establishment Clause.

The irony of this case is that while resolving this
retaliation suit will not embroil the court in theological or doctrinal disputes, applying the ministerial
exception will. Thus, this case presents an example of
how a church autonomy/deference approach presents
more Establishment Clause problems than a neutral
principles of law approach.
To trigger the ministerial exception, the plaintiff
in a discrimination suit must be a "ministerial" employee. In determining who counts as a ministerial
employee, courts do not simply accept a religious
employer’s characterization of a position, as it could
insist that all its employees were ministers. See, e.g.,
Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389,
1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (school claimed that all teachers
"consider teaching to be their personal ministry").
Instead, courts take a functional approach. In the
Sixth Circuit, Perich is a minister if her "primary
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church
governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship." EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2010).
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This query necessarily requires the court to determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. But in order
to decide whether Perich’s primary teaching duties
are important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of
the church, the court might have to delve into the
religious beliefs of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.
Teaching religion class and leading prayers are
clearly religious activities, and would readily qualify
as religious duties. Yet these tasks account for only
approximately 45 minutes out of Perich’s seven-hour
work day, or roughly 11% of her time. If those were
her only religious duties, then she would not count as
a minister under the primary duties test.
However, Hosanna-Tabor argues that, in addition
to the time spent performing religious duties, Perich
serves as a Christian role model for her students - an
activity she performs all day every day. If that is a
religiously important function, then she may well
qualify as a minister under the primary duties test.
But whether serving as a role model is religiously
important - not whether it is important in general,
but whether it is important to the Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church’s spiritual and pastoral
mission - is not a question the courts should answer.
Courts should not be in the position of mediating a
dispute about what is or is not important to a
church’s pastoral mission or resolving a theological
dispute about the religious role of schoolteachers.
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Hosanna-Tabor concedes that the primary duties
test invites Establishment Clause problems. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari of Defendant-Petitioner at 16,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011) (agreeing that forcing courts to decide which duties are
secular and which are religious leads to religious
entanglement). To mitigate these problems, it suggests that the primary duties test should be replaced
with a religious duties test, where the question is
whether the employee performed any important
religious duties. Brief of Defendant-Petitioner at 22,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (June 13, 2011). Although this
proposed solution expands the ministerial exception,
it does not solve the underlying Establishment
Clause problems.
To start, unless the courts are willing to categorize as a minister anyone who performs even one
religious task, courts still have to draw a quantitative
line somewhere. Otherwise a school can make everyone a minister by ensuring that each and every school
employee, from the janitor to the bookkeeper to the
P.E. teacher, leads a prayer at least once or twice
during the school year. As a result, no one who works
for a religious school, hospital, nursing home, social
service organization or house of worship would have
any employment protections.
In any event, changing the threshold amount
of religious duties required does not alter the fact
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that courts might still have to determine whether a
particular duty was religiously important or not.
What if Perich taught only secular subjects? What if
she were the school nurse? What if instead of a
schoolteacher for the Evangelical Lutheran Church
she served as its music director? In order to decide
whether a music director is a minister, the court
would have to rule on the religious significance of
music in the Evangelical Lutheran Church. EEOC v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 802
(4th Cir. 2000). Deciding whether music is integral to
a denomination’s worship services or significant
enough such that teaching it makes one a minister is
exactly the kind of theological decision the courts are
incompetent to make, yet they are exactly the kind of
decision application of the ministerial exception
requires. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian
Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
("The very invocation of the ministerial exemption
requires us to engage in entanglement with a vengeance.").

CONCLUSION
People who wish to serve their God should not
have to choose between their calling and their civil
rights. Yet the ministerial exception essentially strips
ministers of protection against discrimination based
on race, sex, age, and, as here, disability, and leaves
them outside the shelter of the Family Medical Leave
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Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act,
and a host of other protective employment laws.
This absolute immunity from lawsuits cannot be
justified by either the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause. The Americans with Disabilities Act is a neutral law of general applicability, and
therefore does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
To the extent that Perich’s case raises Establishment
Clause problems, it is deciding whether she is a
minister that raises them, not deciding whether the
school retaliated against her.
Jones v. Wolf approves a better approach: Apply
employment discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it would be applied to a
secular employer. If a theological or doctrinal question comes up, defer to the religious institution on
that issue. Notably, accepting the employer’s answer
to a theological question does not guarantee that the
religious employer will prevail. Even if it violates
religious tenets to pay ministers the minimum wage,
a religious school might still be required to do so. Cf.
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor,
471 U.S. 290 (1985). That it may violate religious
tenets for ministers to assert their legal rights does
not automatically mean a religious employer can,
with complete impunity, fire a minister for doing so.
That is the holding of Employment Division v. Smith:
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religion is no longer grounds for exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability.
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